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E. DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT WAIVED THEIR DEFENSES AND 
CLAIMS. 37 
POINT III 
First National Bank & Trust of Williston v. Ashtion, 
436 N.W. 2d 215 (N.D. 1989) 
Freegard v. First West Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 
(Utah 1987) 
Golding v. Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897 
(Utah 1990). 
Heiner v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107; 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The Respondent, on page 1 *of its Brief, identifies one 
standard of review applicable to this case, but fails to identify 
the standards applicable to all of the issues in this case. To 
facilitate the Court having before it the standards applicable to 
the entire case, Appellants set out the following. 
The first issue that the Court may address is whether or not 
the trial court erred in denying Appellants' request for 
additional time to conduct discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In reviewing the trial court's 
action in that regard, the appellate standard of review is 
whether or not the trial court abused its discretion. Sandy City 
v. Salt Lake County, 136 Utah Adv. Rpts. 38 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
As it relates to the second issue of whether or not the 
trial court erred in granting the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the standard of review is as follows: 
The granting of summary judgment is appropriate only 
when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law, and in deciding whether the trial court properly 
granted judgment, as a matter of law to the prevailing 
party, we give no deference to the trial court's view 
of the law; we review it for correctness. 
Whatcott v. Whatcott, 131 Utah Adv. Rpts. 97 (Utah Ct. App. 
4/4/90). 
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Additionally, the appellate court is obligated to review the 
facts in a light most favorable to the party against whom summary 
judgment was granted. Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). 
The third issue to be reviewed by the Court is whether the 
trial court erred in dismissing the Defendants' Counterclaim 
pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion. In reviewing the trial 
court's granting of a motion to dismiss, the Appellate Court is 
obliged to construe the Counterclaim in a light most favorable to 
the Defendants and to indulge all reasonable inferences in their 
favor. In essence, the facts alleged in the Counterclaim are 
deemed to be true and the review is whether, on the facts 
alleged, the law provides relief. See Heiner v. S. J. Groves & 
Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107; 131 Utah Adv. Rpts. 69 (Ct. App. 
3/30/90); Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 668; 114 Utah 
Adv. Rpts. 26 (Sup. Ct. 8/9/89). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM 
WITHOUT ALLOWING DEFENDANTS ADDITIONAL TIME FOR DISCOVERY 
It is respectfully submitted that Judge Lewis, based upon 
the law and facts of this case, erred in granting Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing Defendants' Counter-
claim without allowing sufficient time to conduct discovery. 
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A. A TRIAL COURT SHOULD DECLINE RULING ON DISPOSITIVE! 
MOTIONS WHEN A REASONABLE BASIS HAS BEEN SET OUT IN 
A RULE 56(F) AFFIDAVIT AND THE RESISTING PARTY HAS 
NOT BEEN DILATORY. 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as 
follows: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated 
present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the Court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is 
just. 
Of course, the purpose of filing a Rule 56(f) affidavit is 
to persuade the Court to continue a hearing on a motion for 
summary judgment to permit the resisting party the opportunity to 
obtain affidavits, take depositions or gather evidence. See 
generally Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990). 
An examination of the factual situations dealt with by the 
appellate courts in Utah in prior cases is instructive. One of 
the first cases considering the issue is Strand v. The Associated 
Students of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977). 
The plaintiff in that action sued the defendant based upon the 
theory of libel. The complaint in that case was filed on 
February 13, 1976 and the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on 
March 9, 1976, pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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On March 22, 1976, defendants filed an affidavit supporting 
their motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b). On March 25, 
1976, plaintiff's counsel filed an affidavit wherein he stated 
the following: 
With respect to defendant's motion regarding sovereign 
immunity and their motion to dismiss upon failure to 
state a claim, and upon their affidavit regarding the 
structure of the Utah Daily Chronicle, the undersigned 
requests additional time within which to pursue 
discovery to determine the proper party and parties to 
be included . . . . 
The plaintiff's counsel's affidavit indicated that as of the 
date of the alleged libel, the publisher of the Daily Utah 
Chronicle and other student-funded publications was not clear. 
As a result of the hearing on the motion to dismiss on March 26, 
1976, the trial court issued on order dated March 30, 1976 
granting the motion to dismiss. 
The Court, in discussing Rule 56(f), stated as follows: 
The record shows the affidavit of Nutting to have been 
filed four days prior to the hearing. The matters 
recited therein concern knowledge and the possession 
and control of the defendants; there had not been 
sufficient time since the inception of the lawsuit for 
plaintiff to utilize an opportunity to cross-examine 
the moving parties . . . under such circumstances, it 
was an abuse of discretion to grant defendant's motion. 
The Court should have ordered a continuance to permit 
discovery, or denied the motion for summary judgment, 
without prejudice to its renewal, after adequate time 
had elapsed in which plaintiff could have obtained the 
desired information. 
Id. at 194. 
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The Court in Strand, supra, cited favorably the language 
from Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipeline Co., 130 F.2d 1016, 
1022 (C. A. 3d 1942): 
. the case must, therefore, go back for further 
proceedings as to this cause of action in order to 
afford the plaintiffs an opportunity to produce 
evidence of the facts necessary to support the relief 
for which they ask. It is obvious that this evidence 
must come largely from the defendants. This case 
illustrates the danger of founding the judgment in 
favor of one party, upon his own version of the facts 
within his sole knowledge as set forth in affidavits 
prepared ex parte. . . . The plaintiff should, 
therefore, be given a reasonable opportunity, under 
proper safeguards, to take the depositions and have the 
discovery which they seek . . . . 
The Supreme Court of Utah then dealt with the issue in Cox 
v. Winters, 678 P. 2d 311 (Utah 1984). In that case, Donald 
Winters, an attorney, met with the plaintiffs in the action to 
discuss an investment opportunity involving the purchase and 
resale of uncut diamonds and gold. An agreement was reached 
between the plaintiffs and Winters resulting in a cumulative 
investment of several thousand dollars. Each plaintiff was given 
a promissory note reflecting the amount of their investment. By 
the terms of the notes, plaintiffs were to receive a monthly 
return on their investment of 40%. Notes were signed by Winters, 
and another individual as attorneys-in-fact for the defendant 
Stehl. When payment was not received, plaintiffs filed their 
lawsuit in which Winters and Stehl were both named as defendants. 
The defendant Winters filed a motion to dismiss for failure 
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to state a cause of action and the Court ruled on May 12, 1982 
that unless the plaintiff amended their complaint within 14 days 
to allege fraud, Winters1 motion would be granted. 
Two days prior to the entry of the foregoing order, May 10, 
1982, plaintiffs sent a set of interrogatories and request for 
admissions to the defendant. Plaintiffs filed their amended 
complaint on May 18, 1982 setting forth three causes of action, 
with the first and second directed against Winters. The first 
cause of action alleged that Winters acted in concert with Stehl 
in defrauding the plaintiffs and the second alleged that Winters 
acted alone to defraud the plaintiffs. 
Thereafter, Winters filed a motion to dismiss, which, upon 
approval of the parties, was considered a motion for summary 
judgment. Winters filed with the Court, accompanying his motion 
for summary judgment, an affidavit from Stehl confirming the 
representations made by Winters as to his involvement in the 
transaction. 
In opposition to the defendant's motion, the plaintiff 
simply filed an objection with no accompanying counter-affid-
avits. Subsequently, the plaintiff submitted a supplemental 
objection wherein they requested, pursuant to Rule 56(f), an 
opportunity to make discovery in order to obtain the facts 
necessary to refute the allegations. On July 29, 1982, nearly 
three months after the filing of the amended complaint, the Court 
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granted Winters1 motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court 
in outlining the test to be used in reviewing the trial court's 
holding, restated a portion of its opinion in Strand, supra, 
stated as follows: 
Where, however, the party opposing summary judgment timely 
presents his affidavit under Rule 56(f) stating reasons why 
he is presently unable to offer evidentiary affidavits he 
directly and forthrightly invokes the trial court's 
discretion. Unless dilatory or lacking in merit, the motion 
should be liberally treated, exercising a sound discretion 
and the trial court then determines whether the stated 
reasons are adequate. 
Id. at 312-313. 
On appeal, Winters attempted to limit the holding in 
Strand, indicating that in Strand, the affidavit had been filed 
only four days prior to the hearing on the motion. The Court in 
Cox, supra, indicated that the scope of Strand, should not be 
interpreted and apply too narrowly and then continued: 
While the sufficiency of time to utilize discovery 
proceedings prior to the hearing on summary judgment is 
an important and appropriate factor to consider under 
Rule 56(f), it is no more so than a fact, existing in 
the instant case, that discovery proceedings were 
timely initiated, but never afforded an appropriate 
response. The record shows clearly that plaintiffs 
initiated discovery to gather facts relative to the 
statements made in StehlTs affidavit, but were never 
answered by defendant as required under the rules of 
discovery. Just as a party in Strand was effectively 
precluded from utilizing discovery procedures (and 
thereby cross-examining the movant), due to the 
insufficiency of time (four days), the plaintiffs here 
were likewise precluded by reason of defendants 
failure to respond to discovery. 
Id. at 314. 
7 
The Court in Cox even went further in indicating that a 
motion for summary judgment should be denied when discovery has 
not been completed, and when the resisting party is in the midst 
of discovery. The Court in Cox stated: 
He [Winters] further argues that plaintiffs misstate 
the holding in AuerbachT s in that they claim it applies 
where a party has been unable to undertake discovery 
when in reality it applies only where a party is in the 
midst of discovery when a summary judgment motion is 
filed (emphasis added). 
Id. at 314. See also Auerbach's v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376 (Utah 
1977). 
The Court, in Cox, followed the interpretation of Rule 
56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and held that a 
Rule 56(f) affidavit should be upheld unless a party has failed 
to timely utilize available discovery proceedings or is simply 
attempting a "fishing expedition" which has failed to produce any 
significant evidence. Id. at 314. 
Finally, in a case cited with approval in Cox, supra, 
Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F.Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), 
the party opposing summary judgment simply filed an affidavit 
seeking further discovery in order to "flush out evidence" to 
support his claim. The Court in that case held that Rule 56(f) 
motions should be granted liberally and that inasmuch as an 
adequate opportunity for discovery had not been provided, the 
motion for summary judgment should be adjourned pending the 
completion of such discovery. 
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After complete analysis, the Court in Cox agreed with the 
Court in Strand in ruling that the trial court erred and abused 
its discretion in granting defendant's motion and should have: 
ordered a continuance to permit discovery or deny the 
motion for summary judgment, without prejudice, to its 
renewal after an adequate time had elapsed in which 
plaintiff could have obtained the desired information. 
Id. at 315. 
The Utah Court of Appeals then dealt with the issue in 
Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1987). 
In that case, the Court following the ruling in Cox, supra, 
delineated the factors to be considered under Rule 56(f): 
1. Were the reasons articulated in the Rule 56(f) 
affidavit "adequate", or is the party against whom 
summary judgment is sought merely on a "fishing 
expedition" for purely speculative facts after 
substantial discovery had been conducted without 
producing any significant evidence? 
2. Was there sufficient time since the inception of 
the lawsuit for the party against whom summary judgment 
is sought to use discovery procedures, and thereby 
cross-examine the moving party? 
3. If discovery procedures were timely initiated, was 
the non-moving party afforded an appropriate response? 
Id. at 278. 
In applying the facts of Downtown Athletic Club, supra, the 
appellate court found that over a year had elapsed in which the 
Downtown Athletic Club could have conducted discovery and that 
it had been given several continuances and extensions by the 
trial judge to conduct discovery. The Court found that Downtown 
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Athletic Club did not articulate in its affidavit any specific 
facts that needed further probing and based thereon, ruled that 
the Court did not abuse its discretion in that regard. Id. at 
279. See also Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 (Utah 1990). 
This Court has reviewed Rule 56(f) recently in Sandy City v. 
Salt Lake County, 136 Utah Adv. Rpts. 38 (Utah Ct. App. 6/7/90). 
In that case, the Court again restated the standard set out in 
Cox, supra that Rule 56(f) motion should be granted liberally to 
provide adequate opportunity for discovery unless the movant has 
been dilatory or the request is generally lacking in merit. Id. 
at 41. See also Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 
841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Reeves v. Ggiegy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 
764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
As applied to the facts of this case, it is respectfully 
submitted that Judge Lewis abused her discretion in refusing to 
allow further discovery. The Answer and Counterclaim were timely 
filed in this case on March 11, 1991 (R. 28-34). The Defendants 
sent their First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Produc-
tion of Documents on March 1, 1991 and a Certificate of Service 
was filed with the Court on March 11, 1991 (R. 35). Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment together with Memorandum, Affidavit 
and Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim on the basis of Rule 
12(b)(6) (failure to state a cause of action) were all filed on 
March 26, 1991 (R. 42-83). 
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It was not until March 29, 1991 that the Plaintiff finally 
responded to the Defendants' Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents. 
On April 16, 1991, Defendants filed their Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim 
with supporting Affidavit (R. 88-156). Counsel for Defendants 
filed his Rule 56(f) Affidavit on April 16, 1991 (R. 147-150). 
The Plaintiff filed its Reply Memorandum in support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss the Counter-
claim on April 23, 1991. 
The Court sent a notice on June 12, 1991 setting the matter 
for argument on July 12, 1991 (R. 189-190). The trial court on 
its own motion, by Minute Entry dated June 21, 1991 moved the 
hearing from July 12th to July 9, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. (R. 191-193). 
The matter was then continued from July 9th to July 11th because 
the failure to receive notice and from July 11th to August 14th 
because of scheduling conflicts (R. 194-195). The Court heard 
the arguments on August 14, 1991 and at that time, granted the 
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and awarded 
attorney's fees (R. 198). In the Plaintiff's responsive brief 
herein, Plaintiff takes the position that inasmuch as arguments 
on the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss 
Counterclaim were not heard until August 14, 1992, the Defendants 
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had from April 2, 1991 when they received the Answers to the 
First Set of Interrogatories and Response to Request for 
Production of Documents until August (4-1/2 months) in which to 
complete any additional discovery. 
The Defendants have found no case law to support the 
proposition that after a motion for summary judgment has been 
filed and a response made, including a Rule 56(f) affidavit, 
that the resisting party must then somehow try and schedule 
discovery with the Plaintiff before the Court rules on the Rule 
56(f) affidavit and motion for summary judgment. The filing of 
the Motion for Summary Judgment and a Response with a Rule 56(f) 
Affidavit sets the matter at issue. The Court must then decide 
whether the Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment, based upon 
the absence of controverted fact or rule that additional 
discovery is necessary. Plaintiff fails to cite any authority 
for the proposition that after the case is at issue, Defendants 
somehow had the duty to forge ahead with discovery even though a 
Request for Decision had been filed and the matter had been set 
for hearing. The fact that the case was continued several times 
certainly should not have any affect on the sufficiency of the 
Rule 56(f) Affidavit and the right of the Defendants to move 
forward, pursuant to a scheduling order or definitive ruling of 
the Court, relative to the discovery rights of the parties. 
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The Affidavit of Counsel constituting the Rule 56(f) 
Affidavit (R. 147-49), in summary, detailed the need for the 
following information: 
a. Evidence relating to the relationship between 
the Plaintiff, Bradford Group West and the other 
financial institutions that it dealt with which 
apparently provided the actual money loaned to the 
Defendants. That information would establish the 
chronology of the application by the Defendants to the 
Plaintiff for the loan proceeds, the dealings between 
the Plaintiff and other lending institutions to procure 
those funds, the discovery of documents executed in the 
case between Plaintiff and the actual loaning bank, and 
evidence of the timing of the representations of the 
Plaintiff to the Defendants that it in fact was the 
originating source of the money lent to the Defendants. 
b. Information regarding the actual business 
status of The Bradford Group and information relating 
to The Bradford Group's right to originate the loan 
documents, service the loan and hold itself out as a 
bank. 
c. Evidence relating to the representations made 
by the Plaintiff to the banking organization that 
actually generated the original loan proceeds and 
evidence concerning disclosures made by the originating 
institution to the Plaintiff that were not relayed to 
the Defendants. Additionally, information as to 
whether or not the originating bank knew that the 
agents and employees of the Plaintiff had represented 
that it would continue to work along with the Defen-
dants and refrain from trying to collect the 
$100,000.00 as long as the Defendants were making 
reasonable progress. 
d. The exact dealings between the Plaintiff and 
Defendant with regard to the underlying loan. 
Specifically, all of the documents executed between the 
Plaintiff and Defendants. 
e. All of the above to assess the Defendants' 
defenses, and to establish what fiduciary duty and duty 
of good faith the Plaintiff had to the Defendants. 
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It is respectfully submitted that the reasons articulated in 
the Rule 56(f) Affidavit are adequate. One example of the problem 
created by the inability to obtain discovery is the relegation to 
both parties that the Plaintiff, as part of the security for the 
$100,000 loan, had taken a second on the shopping mall which is 
the subject matter of the original $2,200,000.00 loan (See Motion 
for Approval of Revised Supersedeas Bond and Stay, and Response 
to Motion filed with this Court). Counsel for Defendants did not 
learn until after the case had been decided on summary judgment 
that one of the documents executed between the Plaintiff and 
Defendant was a Trust Deed on the mall which is the subject 
matter of this action. In its response to the Motion for 
Approval of Supersedeas Bond and Stay in this Court, counsel 
specifically indicated that he did not know whether the Trust 
Deed existed or not. The existence of that Trust Deed creates the 
defense of the One-Action Rule which is discussed hereinafter. 
It is respectfully submitted that all of the reasons 
articulated in the Affidavit are adequate and provide a clear 
picture of the issues that counsel for the Defendants wanted to 
address. 
As to the second issue to be addressed in assessing the 
sufficiency of the Rule 56(f) affidavit, there was not sufficient 
time to pursue discovery. Even before the Answers to Inter-
rogatories and Response to Request for Production of Documents 
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were filed by the Plaintiff, Plaintiff filed its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Defendants were then required to file a 
Memorandum in Opposition and file a Rule 56(f) Affidavit. As 
stated above, counsel for Defendants did not even have the 
Answers to Interrogatories in hand when it received the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Unless the Court holds 
that the Defendants had an ongoing duty to continue with 
discovery requests when a Motion for Summary Judgment has been 
filed and set for hearing, there was not sufficient time to 
undertake sufficient discovery. 
As to the third issue raised by the cases as to whether or 
not the non-moving party was afforded an appropriate response to 
discovery requests, a quick review of the Answers to Inter-
rogatories and Response to Request for Production of Documents 
illustrate that in fact the non-moving party, the Defendants 
herein, were not afforded an appropriate response. The 
Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories Nos. 3, 4 and 7 all state 
that documents will be provided at a convenient time, and in fact 
have never been supplied to this date. (See Addendum to Appel-
lant's original Brief) The Request for Production of Documents 
required all of the documents to be produced to counsel for the 
Defendant's office on April 5, 1991 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. No 
production of any documents was ever made by the Plaintiff. The 
Plaintiff either took objections to the Request for Production of 
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Documents, or agreed to provide the documents, which it failed to 
do. The answers to Interrogatories Nos. 1, 8 and 9 are either 
incomplete or evasive. In sum, there can be no question that the 
non-moving party, the Defendants herein were not afforded an 
appropriate response even to the first set of discovery* (See 
Addendum to Appellant's Brief). Again, it is respectfully 
submitted that Defendants did not have a duty to file a Motion to 
Compel until the Court made a ruling relating to the Rule 56(f) 
affidavit. 
Based upon the tests outlined unequivocally by the Utah 
Appellate Courts, the trial court should have delayed ruling on 
the motions until discovery was completed. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO MAKE FINDINGS RELATIVE 
TO THE RULE 56(f) AFFIDAVIT CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
On pages 16 and 17 of Appellant's Brief, the point is made 
that the Court failed to make appropriate findings of fact, and 
based thereon, this matter should be reversed. In its response, 
The Bradford Group makes two arguments. The first relates to the 
authority cited from the Appellants. Respondent contends that 
the cases cited were domestic cases and that no authority has 
been cited to support the proposition that the failure to enter 
findings in this case constitutes reversible error (Respondent's 
Brief, p. 21). 
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The second argument made by Respondent is that the trial 
court in ruling on the issues presented by the Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment adequately dealt with the facts and 
therefore, no further findings were necessary (Respondent's 
Brief, p. 21). 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as 
follows: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or 
with an advisory jury, the Court shall find the facts 
specially and shall state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to 
Rule 58A . . . . 
Appellants have previously cited to the Court the three 
prong approach the trial court should take in analyzing and 
deciding the sufficiency of a Rule 56(f) Affidavit. The trial 
court must first determine if the Affidavit is adequate; second, 
if there has been sufficient time to allow the use of appropriate 
discovery procedures; and third, if the discovery procedures were 
timely initiated and the non-moving party afforded an appropriate 
response. See Sandy City, supra at 42. 
Rule 56(f) by the very wording requires the Court to decide 
the sufficiency of the Rule 56(f) Affidavit before ruling on the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The record in this case establishes an absence of any 
ruling on the Rule 56(f) Affidavit. Contrary to the argument of 
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the Respondent, the fact that the Court did not find any material 
issues as it relates to the Motion for Summary Judgment has 
nothing to do with whether or not facts could be developed to 
refute the Motion for Summary Judgment or to support the 
Counterclaim. Rule 56(f) clearly contemplates its own set of 
findings or rulings by the Court. 
As noted by the Court in Jensen v. Jensen, 775 P.2d 436; 110 
Utah Adv. Rpts. 27 (Ct. App. 6/1/89), adequate findings of the 
Court are those that: (1) are sufficiently detailed; (2) include 
enough facts to disclose the process through which the ultimate 
conclusion is reached; (3) indicate the process is logical and 
properly supported; and (4) are not clearly erroneous. Unless 
the record meets that standard, the case must be reversed. 
The Supreme Court again restated the need for adequate 
findings in Reed v. Mutual of Omaha Co., 776 P. 2d 896 (Utah 
1989). In that case, the Court stated: 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires the Judge in a bench trial to "find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon." [citing Rules of Procedures] The failure to 
enter adequate findings of fact on material issues may 
be reversible error. See, e. g., Acton v. J.D. 
Deliriam Corp. , 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). The 
findings must be articulated with sufficient detail so 
that the basis of the ultimate conclusion can be 
understood. See E. G., Id. at 999; Smith v. Smith, 726 
P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 
1336, 1338-39 (Utah 1979). 
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There is no question that the Utah Supreme Court and the 
Utah Court of Appeals had both determined that it is not 
necessary for the trial court to enter findings of fact relative 
to a granting of a motion for summary judgment because, in that 
the granting of a motion for summary judgment presumes that there 
are no disputed issues of fact. See generally Mtn. States Tel. & 
Tel., Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 
(Utah 1984); Taylor v. Estate of Grant Taylor, 102 Utah Adv. 
Rpts. 36, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 2/15/89). 
However, the fact that the court is not required to enter 
findings of fact when granting summary judgment cannot be 
construed as holding that the trial court need not review 
specifically on the adequacy of the Rule 56(f) Affidavit. As 
addressed initially in this Brief, the standard of review before 
this Court as it relates to Rule 56(f), is whether or not the 
trial court abused its discretion. If the lower court did not 
exercise its discretion, it is impossible to determine if there 
is an abuse of discretion. 
Inasmuch as the Court was aware of Mr. Anderson's Affidavit 
(R. 239-240, 243), and the Court made no ruling with regard to 
Rule 56(f), the Court should reverse the matter based upon the 
trial court's failure to make findings and examine the issue as 
to the need of further discovery. 
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C. BECAUSE OF THE COURT'S RULING, THE DEFENDANTS HAVE 
BEEN PRECLUDED FROM RAISING A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT 
ISSUES. 
1. Fraud and Misrepresentation. By way of Answer, 
Counterclaim and Affidavit, Defendants contend that the agents 
and employees of the Plaintiff specifically represented to them 
that The Bradford Group was the source of the $2,200,000.00 loan 
and that, as it relates to the $100,000.00, the Plaintiff would 
take no action to collect the same as long as the Defendants were 
moving along in good faith, to obtain the monies to pay the 
same. (I. N. Fisher Affidavit, para. 11, R. 153; Fifth Defense, 
para. 16 of Defendants' Answer and para. 6 of the Counterclaim, 
R. 30-33). 
In pages 13-16 of the Appellant's original Brief, Appellants 
lay out
 0 the issues that needed to be addressed by discovery 
relating to their claim of fraud and misrepresentation that is 
both a defense to the Complaint and an element of the Counter-
claim. 
The Respondents contend that the Appellants' defenses of 
fraud and misrepresentation were waived contractually by the 
execution of the forbearance and extension agreements executed by 
the Defendants. (See p. 34-36 of Appellants' Brief, and the 
Forbearance and Extension Agreement, R. 65, para. 13, R. 68-71). 
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Generally, the parol evidence rule would prohibit the 
introduction of contemporaneous. conversations, statements or 
representations offered for the purpose of varying or adding to 
the terms of an integrated contract. See E.I.E. v. St. Benedicts 
Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1192 (Utah 1981); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. 
v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 266, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (1972). 
However, as noted by the Court in Union Bank v. Swenson, 706 P.2d 
663 (Utah 1985): 
This general rule [the parol evidence rule] as stated, 
contained an exception for fraud. Parol evidence is 
admissible to show the circumstances under which the 
contract was made, or the purpose for which the writing 
was executed. This is so even after the writing is 
determined to be an integrated contract. Admitting 
parol evidence in such circumstances avoids the 
judicial enforcement of a writing that appears to be a 
binding integration, but in fact is not. 
What appears to be a complete and binding 
integrated agreement may be a forgery, a 
joke, a sham, or an agreement without 
consideration, or it may be voidable for 
fraud, duress, mistake, or the like, or it 
may be illegal. Such invalidating causes 
need not and commonly do not appear on the 
face of the writing. 
Restatement (2d) of Contracts, §214, Comment (1981). 
Union Bank, supra, at 665. 
To understand the significance of the holding in Union Bank, 
a summary recital of the facts is important. The appellants 
Swenson executed a promissory note in favor of Union Bank. The 
appellant Ron Swenson also signed the note for the lumber 
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company. Upon default, the plaintiff brought the action to 
recover on the note. 
In response, the appellants contended that none of the 
defendants intended their signatures to have effect, and that the 
representatives of the bank had promised the Swensons that their 
signatures were for appearance only, and that no collection 
action would be brought against them personally. Each of the 
defendants signed affidavits alleging that the bank officers told 
the appellants that their personal signatures were needed to 
satisfy the bank auditors and loan committee. The trial court, 
applying the parol evidence rule found no genuine issue of 
material fact and granted summary judgment. 
In reviewing the matter, the Court stated as follows: 
Protection against judicial enforcement of writings 
that appear to be binding integrations, but in fact are 
not lies in the provision that all relevant evidence is 
admissible on the threshold issue of whether the 
writing was adopted by the parties as an integration of 
their agreement. This appears to be so, even if the 
writing clearly states it is to be a complete and final 
statement of the parties agreement. 
Id. at 665. 
The Court found in the Union Bank case that the record did 
not include a specific factual determination of whether or not 
the note was an integration. The Court found that the affidavit 
in fact presented a genuine issue of material fact requiring a 
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specific determination as to whether or not the note was an 
integration. Id. at 666. 
Finally, the Court in Union Bank stated the following with 
regard to parol evidence: 
parol evidence is admissible to prove that a 
party was induced into a contract by fraud, despite a 
determination that a writing is an integrated contract. 
E.I.E., supra; B. D. Moran, Inc. v. First Security 
Corp. , 82 Utah 316, 24 P.2d 384 (1933); State Bank of 
Lehi v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1977); 
Bullfrog Marina, supra; Rainford v. Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 
252, 255, 451 P.2d 769, 770-71 (1969). 
Id. at 666. 
The Court in Union Bank cites a number of cases from other 
states so holding. There is simply no question that the issue of 
when the Defendants knew that the Plaintiff was not the lending 
institution and had knowledge that the representations made by 
the Plaintiff as to its status and when the $100,000.00 would be 
due, are all genuine issues of fact raised legitimately by the 
Affidavit of I. N. Fisher (R. 151-56). Further discovery could 
only strengthen the existence of those issues. 
2. One-Action Rule. Attached to their Motion for 
Approval of Revised Supersedeas Bond, the Appellants have 
attached the Second Deed of Trust given to the Plaintiff to 
secure the $100,000 obligation on the shopping mall which was the 
subject matter of the original $2,200,000.00 loan. The Plain-
tiffs, in this action, seek to proceed against the guarantors 
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without first exhausting the real estate given to them contem-
poraneously with the execution of the $100,000.00 Note (See 
Motion for Approval of Revised Supersedeas Bond and Motion for 
Stay on Appeal filed with this Court). 
The One-Action Rule is stated in Utah Code Annotated §78-37-
1 (1965 as amended): 
There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or 
the enforcement of any rights secured solely by 
mortgage upon real estate, which action must be in 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. 
Judgment shall be given adjudging the amount due, with 
costs and disbursements, and the sale of the mortgage 
property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount 
and accruing costs, and directing the sheriff to 
proceed and sell the same according to the provisions 
of law relating to sales on execution, and a special 
execution or order of sale shall be issued for that 
purpose. 
There have been a plethora of cases in Utah dealing with the 
One-Action Rule. Basically, the One-Action Rule overrules the 
common-law right of a creditor to choose any or all remedies 
available to him in pursuing a debt by forcing the creditor to 
proceed according to the judicial interpretation of a statutory 
foreclosure scheme. In Utah, the remedies available have been 
well documented: 
Where a creditor owns a debt secured by a deed of trust 
or chattel mortgage containing the power of sale, two 
remedies are available. He may proceed under the 
power, or foreclose in a manner provided by law for the 
foreclosure of mortgages. 
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Morgan v. Layton, 60 Utah 280, 208 P. 505 (1922); Barker v. 
Utah-Idaho Cent R.R., 57 Utah 494, 195 P. 635 (1921); Stevens v. 
Improvement Co., 20 Utah 267, 58 P. 843 (1899). 
In recent years, the Court has expanded the One-Action Rule 
in two ways. First, the debtor can assert the rule as an 
affirmative defense to the creditor's premature attempt to obtain 
a personal judgment through an action on the underlying note. 
See G. Nelson and D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law, §8.2, at 
599. Had the facts been discovered in this case, the One-Action 
Rule could have been asserted by the Defendants in that manner. 
It is clear under the One-Action Rule that a creditor may not 
obtain a personal judgment against the debtor until after the 
real property security has been exhausted. See generally 
Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d 1333, 1334 (Utah 
1983); G. Nelson and D. Whitman, supra, Note 18 at §8.2. 
The second application to the One-Action Rule occurs where a 
creditor proceeds against the debtor's general assets. Cases have 
held that even though the debtor may have failed to use the One-
Action Rule as an affirmative defense, the debtor can still 
assert the rule as a sanction against the creditor for not having 
first foreclosed on the security. See G. Nelson and D. Whitman, 
supra, Note 18, §8.2 at 599 and Walker v. Community Bank, 10 Cal 
3d 729, 518 P.2d 329 (1974). It is the second means that the 
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Defendants attempted to use in obtaining the stay on appeal. 
(See Appellant's Motion for Approval of Revised Supersedeas Bond, 
Memorandum and Affidavit). 
As applied to the facts of this case, the Plaintiff took a 
second mortgage on the shopping center, which is the subject 
matter of this action (see Memorandum and Affidavit in Support of 
Appellant's Motion for Approval of Revised Supersedeas Bond filed 
with this Court) and should be precluded from pursuing the 
Defendants personally, until the collateral is exhausted. 
Addressing possible defenses to the imposition of the One-
Action Rule, the fact that the Plaintiff has only a second 
mortgage on the property is not enough to excuse it from 
foreclosing on the real estate. Even if the Defendants contended 
that their second mortgage was worthless, such a claim would not 
avoid the imposition of the sanctions associated with the One-
Action Rule. The Utah Supreme Court reviewed that issue in 
Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 
1983), and held that before claiming that the collateral is 
worthless and therefore that the creditor had no obligation to 
foreclose upon the real property, that the holder of a second 
deed of trust could not merely speculate that foreclosure of the 
first deed of trust would complete exhaust the collateral. The 
Court held that security in the real property must in fact be 
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exhausted and any deficiency established to a certainty before 
the exception would apply. Id. at 1336. See also City Consumer 
Servs., Inc. v. Peters, 160 Utah Adv. Rpts. 16, 17 (Utah Ct. App. 
5/8/91); and Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge #1453, 88 
Utah 577, 583, 56 P.2d 1046, 1049 (1936). 
The Plaintiff has asserted, that the Defendants executed 
waivers contained in the Forbearance and Extension Agreements 
that they signed. However, all Courts addressing the issue have 
uniformly ruled that one cannot waive the protection of the One-
Action Rule. The Courts have analogized waiver in that situation 
to a person signing a home mortgage and waiving the right to 
judicial or non-judicial foreclosure and allowing immediate 
repossession and immediate assessment of a deficiency. See 
generally Winkleman v. Sides, 31 Cal. App. 2d 387, 88 P.2d 147 
(1939); Nevada Whole-Sale Lumber Co. v. Myers Realty, Inc., 92 
Nev. 24, 544 P.2d 1204 (1976). 
In this case, James F. Kern and I. N. Fisher are the 
principals of Loran Corporation, a California corporation, which 
corporation is also the general partner in a California limited 
partnership known as "SLC Limited IV." The Defendants Kern and 
Fisher are the guarantors who, in addition to Loran Corporation, 
were sued in the present action. The fact that Kern and Fisher 
are guarantors, but at the same time, are the principals of Loran 
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Corporation still gives them the right to invoke the One-Action 
Rule. See McCloskey v. M, P. J. Co., 70 N.J. Super. 46, 174 A.2d 
742 (N.J. Super. Ct. ATP, Div. 1961). California, which has 
addressed the issue, has determined that under California 
guaranty law, a Court may consider a guarantor to be a co-obligor 
of the underlying debt, thus precluding any proceedings against 
the guarantor without first foreclosing on the security. See 
Component Sys. Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 101 Nev. 76, 
92 P.2d 1296, 1299-1300 (1985). 
In a similar action, the Court in First National Bank & 
Trust of Williston v. Ashtion, 436 N.W. 2d 215 (N.D. 1989), dealt 
with a case where the guarantors were personally liable on the 
underlying note and deed of trust. The Court reasoned that the 
guaranty did not enlarge the guarantors1 liability and the One-
Action Rule prevented the bank from pursuing the action against 
the guarantors based upon the guaranty. See also Lawyers & Home-
Makers Building & Loan Assoc, v. Kohn, 14 N.J. Misc. 153, 183 A. 
467 (N.J. Super.), reversed on other grounds, 117 N.J.L. 238, 187 
Atlanta 538, (N.J. 1936). 
In summary, it appears that the Plaintiff is barred from 
proceeding in this action on the guarantees without foreclosing 
by the One-Action Rule. Had the Court allowed discovery to take 
place and either force the Plaintiff to produce its documents, or 
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allow a Motion to Compel, that issue could have been determined 
and made part of the litigation. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A thorough discussion of the issues warranting this Court's 
reversal of the Order Granting Summary Judgment is set out in the 
Appellants' original brief (Appellants' Brief, p. 20-35). 
Appellants seek only to discuss those issues raised by the 
Respondent in their Reply Brief. 
A. THE PLAINTIFF IS GOVERNED BY THE FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS ACT. 
The Plaintiff goes to great lengths to argue that the Utah 
Financial Institutions Act, Utah Code Annotated §7-1-101 et seq. 
(1981 as amended), does not apply to the Plaintiff because the 
Plaintiff is not "a financial institution" (Appellants' Brief, p. 
22-24). That argument is refuted by the clear language of the 
Act. There is no question that Utah Code Annotated §7-1-501 (1987 
as amended), lists the persons and institutions that are subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Department and are subject to the 
supervision and examination by the Department of Financial 
Institutions. 
However, in addition, the Financial Institutions Act 
contains certain statutory controls applicable to all persons and 
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entities, residing or doing business in Utah whether or not 
specifically identified in Utah Code Annotated §7-1-501 (1987 as 
amended). 
Utah Code Annotated §7-1-701(1) states as follows: 
It is unlawful for any person not authorized to conduct 
a business subject to the jurisdiction of this 
department to use a name, sign, advertisement, 
letterhead, or other printed matter which represents, 
or in any other manner to represent to the public that 
that person, or its place of business, is a financial 
institution, or is conducting a business which is 
subject to the jurisdiction of the department. 
The statute could not be clearer. The statute makes it 
unlawful for any person, whether or not that person is subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Financial Institutions Act to hold itself 
out as a financial institution. To somehow argue that the 
portion of the statute outlined above pertains only to financial 
institutions is ludicrous. The intent of the section is to 
restrict persons not under the regulation and control of the 
Financial Institutions Act from representing to the public that 
they are legitimate financial institutions. 
To that same end, Utah Code Annotated §7-1-701(2) provides 
as follows: 
. No person not authorized to conduct a banking 
business under Chapter 3 may transact business in this 
state under any name, or use any name or sign, or 
circulate or use any letterhead or bill head which 
contains the word "bank", "banker", or "banking", or 
any other word or combination of words indicating that 
the business is a business of a bank. Such a person 
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may not advertise or represent in any manner which 
indicates or reasonably implies that its business is of 
the character or kind carried on by a bank, or which is 
likely to lead any person reasonably to believe that 
its business is that of a bank, or in the case of a 
federal or state savings bank, that its business is 
other than that of a savings bank. . . . 
Utah Code Annotated §7-1-304 (1981 as amended), gives the 
Commissioner of the Utah Financial Institutions power to bring 
appropriate civil action to: 
prevent or restrain any persons from engaging in this 
state in any business subject to the jurisdiction of 
the department without first having obtained the 
authority to do so as provided in this title, or from 
violating any other provisions of this title or any 
rule, regulation, or order of the Commissioner 
(emphasis added). 
Utah Code Annotated §7-1-701(9) (1989 as amended), provides 
as follows: 
Every person, corporation, association, or other 
business entity, and every officer of the corporation 
or association violating the provisions of this section 
is guilty of a Class A Misdemeanor, and each stay of 
the violation shall constitute a separate offense. 
There simply can be no question based upon the foregoing 
that the Financial Institutions Act does in fact apply to the 
Plaintiff. In its Brief, the Plaintiff acknowledges that it is 
not licensed or authorized by the Financial Institutions Act to 
use the name "bank" in its name, and therefore, the Plaintiff 
admits a violation of the Financial Institutions Act. 
B. USE OF THE TERM "BANK" DOES VIOLATE THE FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS ACT. 
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Respondents argue on pages 24 through 26 of its Brief that 
the Plaintiff has not improperly used a derivative of the "bank" 
in its name. It is unnecessary to recite the provisions of the 
Utah Financial Institutions Act again. The Act prohibits any 
person not licensed and authorized by the Utah Department of 
Financial Institutions to use the word "bank" or any derivative 
in its name. There is not an exception for "mortgage banker" or 
"investment banker", or any of the terms used by the Plaintiff in 
this case. 
Respondent then argues on page 26 of his Brief that Utah 
Code Annotated 7-1-701(8)(a) applies: 
Notwithstanding any other restriction in this section, 
the prohibition of the use of specific names and words 
in subsections (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) does not 
apply if the effect of the use of the name or word 
would not likely lead any person to reasonably believe 
that a person or his place of business is a financial 
institution, or is conducting a business subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Department. 
That issue is put to rest by virtue of paragraph 11 of I.N. 
Fisher's Affidavit wherein he testifies: 
Throughout the entire transaction with the Plaintiff 
originating with the loan of $2,200,000.00, the agents 
and employees of the Plaintiff represented themselves 
as a banking institution authorized within the State of 
Utah to so act . . . . (R. 153). 
C. THE CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED BY THE DEFENDANTS 
SUPPORT THEIR DEFENSE AND CLAIMS. 
On pages 29-31 of the Respondent's Brief, Respondent 
contends that even if the Plaintiff violated the Financial 
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Institutions Act, that there is no authority to void the 
transaction between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. 
As discussed hereinafter, if a private cause of action is 
generated from the Utah Financial Institutions Act, the Court has 
the province to determine the appropriate sanction and damage 
that may be recovered. 
The Respondent, at the trial court level and on appeal, 
compares the facts of this case to one where one private 
individual lends money to another private individual. The claim 
of the Respondent is that since there is no statute in Utah 
prohibiting a private person from lending money, the Court should 
not impose any sanction. 
There are many things that a lay person could do for another 
individual that a lawyer or doctor might do. If a person held 
himself out as a doctor and performed services and collected 
money in that capacity when in fact he was not so trained, 
certified or licensed, a doctor should not be able to contend 
that inasmuch as he was only doing tasks that a lay person could 
do, no sanction should apply. Such a person would be guilty of 
fraud and misrepresentation and the very least that the Court 
should do is to require the individual to disgorge the profits 
and pay the damages caused by his conduct. 
33 
The 20th Century has presented incident after incident that 
has culminated in very strict federal and state laws and 
regulations pertaining to banking. Individual and national 
crises have been caused by loose handling of financial affairs. 
All of us assume certain things when we take our money to an 
institution that holds itself out as a bank. Our level of 
expectation regarding performance and ability is much higher in 
dealing with a "bank11 than if we are dealing with a neighbor or 
individual person. Thus, in this case, Defendants respectfully 
submit to the Court that it is appropriate that the Plaintiff be 
precluded from recovering fees, interest and profits from the 
Defendants because it entered into the transaction with the 
Defendants and intentionally held itself out as a bank. 
D. A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION EXISTS TO ENFORCE THE 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT. 
On pages 31-33 of Respondent's Brief, Respondent contends 
that a private cause of action cannot be implied from the Utah 
Financial Institutions Act. 
The first argument raised by Respondent is that the 
appellants' analysis and argument are without basis because 
Appellants had cited federal statutes and cases. A quick review 
of the area demonstrates that a myriad of state courts have 
implied the exact same analysis as that outlined in Cort v. Ash, 
422 U.S. 66 (1974). For instance in Fasse v. Lower Heating 
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and Air Conditioning, Inc., 241 Kans. 387, 736 P.2d 930 (Kans. 
1987), the Court stated as follows: 
Courts do not require explicit statutory authorization 
for familiar remedies to enforce statutory obligations. 
When the legislature has left the matter at large for 
judicial determination, the Court's function is to 
decide what remedies are appropriate in light of the 
statutory language and purpose and their traditional 
modes by which courts compel performance of legal 
obligations. If civil liability is appropriate to 
effectuate the purposes of a statute, courts are not 
denied this traditional remedy because it is not 
specifically authorized. 
Id. at 934. See also Montana-Dakota Co. v. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 
U.S. 246, 71 S. Ct. 692, 95 L.Ed 912 (1951); State ex rel. 
Phillips v. Wm. Liquor Bd., 59 Wash. 2d 565, 369 P.2d 844 (1962); 
Branson v. Branson, 190 Okla. 347, 123 P.2d 643 (1942). 
Second, Respondent contends that the elements required by 
the Cort v. Ash, supra analysis are not met in this matter. The 
factors include: (1) whether the Plaintiff was one of the class 
for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there was 
any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, 
either to create such a remedy or to deny one; and (3) whether 
implication of such a remedy was consistent with the underlying 
purposes of the legislative scheme. As it relates to the facts 
of this case, the statute explicitly prohibits an entity or 
individual holding themselves out as a bank when in fact they are 
not so authorized and licensed. Established by affidavit in this 
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case, the agents and employees of the Plaintiff held The Bradford 
Group out as a bank. Those concise facts do not present a "broad 
brush analysis." Rather, the facts present a specific violation 
of the Financial Institutions Act by the Plaintiff and the 
victims of that specific violation are the Defendants. Certain-
ly, one cannot argue that the Defendants in this case are not 
members of the class of persons sought to be protected by the 
prohibi- tion against misrepresentation as to banking status. 
As to the second element, Utah Code Annotated §7-l-102(1)(a) 
states in part as follows: 
The legislature finds that it is in the public interest 
to strengthen the regulation, supervision and examina-
tion of persons, firms, corporations, associations and 
other business entities furnishing financial services 
to the people of this state or owning and controlling 
those businesses. The legislature further finds that 
there has been substantial changes in the structure of 
financial services1 industry and the nature and 
characteristics of the institutions and other business 
entities furnishing those services . . . . 
(d) It is the intent of the legislature that the 
provisions of this title be interpreted and implemented 
to promote those purposes. 
The intent of the Utah Legislature was that the Utah 
Financial Institutions Act be interpreted and implemented to 
promote the explicit purpose of strengthening the supervision of 
business entities furnishing financial services to the people of 
this State. Certainly, implying a private cause of action 
fulfills that purpose. The only effective remedy against 
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violators of the Act is to allow a private cause of action. The 
victim who loses money or is wronged by virtue of a violation of 
the Financial Institutions Act can only be fully compensated if a 
private cause of action exists. Certainly, one of the purposes 
of the legislature was to strengthen the laws relating to 
financial institutions and protect the people of the State of 
Utah. A cease and desist order entered against an entity 
violating the Act does nothing to compensate the person who is 
wronged. The best way to insure that entities or individauls 
abide by the terms of the Utah Financial Institutions Act is to 
allow that person to be compensated when wronged. 
The third element certainly is met in this case. A private 
cause of action allowing a victim to be compensated when the 
Financial Institutions Act is violated is certainly consistent 
with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to 
strengthen the regulation, supervision and examination of 
entities rendering financial services to others. 
E. DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT WAIVED THEIR DEFENSES AND CLAIMS. 
On pages 34-36, the Respondent contends that the guarantors 
waived their claims and defenses. 
There is nothing in the record to substantiate a waiver. 
The Defendants in this case acknowledge that they agreed to pay a 
$100,000.00 loan fee. That is not the issue before the Court. 
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The issue before the Court is the fact that the Plaintiff mis-
represented itself as a bank and further misrepresented to the 
Defendants that it was the originator of the loan and could 
influence when the loan would be called due and when extensions 
would be given. It is on the basis of those misrepresentations 
that the Defendants contend that they are not required to pay the 
$100,000.00. The Defendants did not have any knowledge that the 
Plaintiff was not in fact a bank and did not have the right to 
grant further extensions until the lawsuit was filed. At best, 
the issue relating to the Defendant's knowledge is one which is 
in fact disputed, and is not included in the undisputed facts 
relied upon by the trial court. Accordingly, waiver is certainly 
not a bar to the Defendant's contention. 
Defendants have previously addressed the issue of fraud as 
an exception to the parol evidence rule and will not readdress it 
in this Point. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COUNTERCLAIM 
The Defendants in their Counterclaim allege that The 
Bradford Group held itself out as a banking organization and that 
in that capacity, The Bradford Group took payment from the 
Defendants for fees, origination costs and the like which would 
normally be paid to banks or bankers. Additionally, Defendants 
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allege that regard to the transaction with the Plaintiff, the 
Plaintiff failed to disclose that the loan proceeds were 
generated by another financial institution, and otherwise failed 
to disclose important and relevant financial information to the 
Defendants. As a result of the conduct of the Plaintiff, the 
Defendants contend that they are entitled to all fees paid to the 
Plaintiff, interest payments, extension fees, legal fees and the 
like (R. 32-33). In the Affidavit of I. N. Fisher (R. 151-156), 
the Defendant specifically allege that the Plaintiff misrepre-
sented not only its status, but when the $100,000.00 would be 
due. The Defendants operated under the assumption as long as 
they were making reasonable progress, the $100,000.00 would not 
be called due. As a result of that misrepresentation, the 
Defendants have been sued, been obligated to pay the costs of 
the litigation and suffered other damage for which they are 
entitled to recover. The Counterclaim was dismissed based upon 
the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This Court has held that: 
When we review a judgment entered on a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure: "we are obliged to construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor." 
Arrow Indus, v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 
936 (Utah 1988); see also Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, 
Inc. , 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983); Mounteer v. Utah 
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Power & Light Co., 773 P. 2d 405, 406 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). A motion to dismiss will be affirmed only 
"where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff 
would not be entitled to relief under any state of 
facts which could be proved in support of its claim. 
Arrow, 767 P.2d at 936; see also Freegard v. First West 
Natyl Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987); Mounteer, 
773 P.2d at 406. 
Heiner, supra at 107. See also Golding v. Ashley Central 
Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897 (Utah 1990). 
As set out before, the issue of waiver and estoppel are 
factual issues that need to be resolved. It is the contention of 
the Plaintiff that the Defendants1 Counterclaim is barred by the 
doctrine of waiver, certainly cannot be disposed of by a Motion 
to Dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. As indicated by the cases set out above, the conten-
tions outlined in the Counterclaim must be deemed as true. 
Certainly, the Defendants have a cause of action for fraud and 
misrepresentation, and based thereon, the Motion to Dismiss the 
Counterclaim should be reversed and remanded. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff in this case seeks to collect a $100,000.00 
fee for brokering alone. Defendants respectfully submit that 
based upon the misrepresentation, violation of the Financial 
Institution Act and its conduct in seeking to collect from the 
guarantors before foreclosing on the real property, that the 
decision of the lower court should be reversed and that the 
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Defendants1 Counterclaim be remanded for a factual determination 
and judgment. 
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mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following, 
postage prepaid. 
Scott F. Young, Esq. #3890 
Mark F. James, Esq. #5295 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147. 
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ADDENDUM 
42 
GARY J. ANDERSON, #4457 
Attorney for Defendants 
Central Park East 
1815 South State, Suite 3500 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 224-6660 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRADFORD GROUP WEST, INC., ) 
) REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 
Plaintiff, ) OF DOCUMENTS 
vs. ) 
JAMES F. KERN, an individual ) 
I.N. FISHER, an individual, ) 
and LORAN CORPORATION, a ) 
California corporation, ) 
) Civil No. 910900291CV 
Defendants. ) 
DEFENDANTS SUBMIT herewith the following Request for 
Production of Documents to the Plaintiff: 
The Defendant is required to provide the following described 
documents at the law offices of ANDERSON & BLACK, Central Park 
East, 1815 South State Street, Suite 3500, Orem, Utah 84058 on 
April 5, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. 
(1) All documents referenced in Defendants' First Set of 
Interrogatories. 
(2) All documents of every type or nature within your 
possession which relate to the transaction with the Defendant 
from the execution of the construction loan documents on December 
4, 1985 to the present. Without limiting the generality of the 
request, specific request is made for all contracts, attachments, 
notes, trust deeds, guarantees, correspondence, files, inter-
office memoranda or work papers. 
(3) All documents within the Plaintiff's possession 
relating to the loan arrangements with the Defendant originating 
with the Loan Agreement dated December 4, 1985 and as it 
specifically relates to monies the Plaintiff obtained to finance 
said loan from Dime Bank, any other banks including banks 
specifically located in Idaho. 
DATED this 1st day of March, 1991. 
/s/ 
GARY J. ANDERSON, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant 
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